

81-F01-238

WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP  
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Washington 25, D. C.

ENCLOSURE "J"

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE CHANGES  
IN THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

WSEG REPORT NO. 50

27 December 1960

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Enclosure "J"  
WSEG Report No. 50  
Log No. S-60-626

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PROBLEM

1. To explore possible changes in the nature of the threat and the implications thereof for the U.S. strategic offensive posture.

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

2. In any country, military strength in a period five years or so hence will consist of strength now in being, of accretions of strength now programmed, and of other accretions decided upon between now and the period of interest. Force in being in the future period will therefore depend in significant measure upon decisions and actions in the intervening period. This is a matter of intention which, in turn, is to some extent a product of internal forces and to some extent a response to external conditions. It is therefore appropriate that inquiry into weapons requirements should include concern for those factors that may alter the future dimensions of the threat that must be confronted.

3. The same logic that induces us to look at the nature and dimensions of the potential enemy threat as a primary consideration in determining the requirements of our own military forces, compels the enemy, in turn, to gauge his military requirements upon what we do. Consideration of our own future weapons requirements cannot therefore ignore the factor of the variable response, in form of enemy military policy, that different U.S. military policies may elicit.

4. The threat to the U.S. should not be measured solely by the strength available to actual or potential enemies. The seriousness of this threat is also affected by the intention and resolution of enemy nations to employ their strength against us. It is therefore appropriate to take into account the factor of the willingness of the enemy to accept the risks of modern war.

5. This paper will not presume to judge the effectiveness of specific strategies or weapons systems. It will be confined to:

a. Possible changes in the nature and dimensions of the threat and what these possible changes imply, in general, concerning U.S. military requirements;

b. The probable range of Communist strategic intentions as they concern U.S. military requirements, and the problem of possible influence upon these intentions of variable U.S. military postures and strategies;

c. Inter-relationships between different forms of U.S. military strength, especially as a function of probable Communist response to our total posture.

#### CONCLUSIONS

6. The probable growth of both Communist strength and the areas of potential East-West conflict will require greater and more flexible military strength than we have needed in the past, with a capability of more widely dispersed application of force.

7. United States strategic offensive systems may play an indirect role in limiting the scope of local conflicts, but the military deterrence or resistance to local aggression will rest principally upon other forces and weapons.

8. Because of the strategic stalemate, limited war forces are likely to become the primary military means employed in combat to attain political objectives.

9. A limited war posture, unduly weak in conventional capabilities in both manpower and weapons, can materially increase the probability of general war by accident or miscalculation and thus erode the deterrent effect of the strategic posture.

10. Because a favorable outcome of a general nuclear war does not appear attainable in the 1964-67 time period, prudence requires that we reduce the number of issues to be resolved primarily by threat of or recourse to strategic nuclear forces. It is, therefore, highly important that, in order to avoid weakening the military support of national policies, we be assured of adequate alternative means which afford confidence of a favorable outcome if actually employed.

11. For as long as there is a hostile confrontation in which we must depend upon the restraint of our enemies as well as ourselves to avoid general nuclear war, we must choose a difficult course between two extremes. We must convey, on the one hand, that we will be restrained so long as our enemies are, but on the other hand that under extreme provocation we would not necessarily wait until they have struck first. The safest way to give evidence of our own restraint will be to limit the number of issues on which strategic sanctions are threatened. An unmistakable second strike capability -- which is bound to include a fearful first strike capability -- is the most convincing means of showing the enemy that it is in his interest to be restrained with respect to general nuclear war, and also with respect to extreme forms of provocation short of that.

## DISCUSSION

### GENERAL PROSPECTS OF GROWTH AND CHANGE IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD<sup>1/</sup>

12. The economic and military strength of the Communist Bloc is expected to increase markedly over the next decade. Khrushchev's position appears firm, and struggles for power among his rivals or successors are unlikely to menace the stability of the regime, although the possibility is real that a contest for succession may introduce increased instabilities of policy into the Soviet scene, and ultimately into the Communist scene as a whole. Much may depend upon who dies first, Khrushchev or Mao.

13. Soviet domination of Eastern European satellites is expected to continue. The satellite regimes have been consolidated and prospects of real political change appear extremely remote. However, popular hostility toward Communism and toward the USSR is a serious problem in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, but recurrence of attempted revolt or national revolt is judged highly unlikely. For this reason the USSR may be obliged to continue to allow the satellite regimes some leeway in internal policy, to count upon no major satellite contributions in case of war, and to be prepared to move its own forces into satellite areas not now occupied.

14. Sino-Soviet relationships are so important, also at present so fluid and complex, that they cannot be dealt with satisfactorily in the brief notations of this section. There is a summary of the current status and outlook in Appendix "A", and the potentialities for significant change and developments on the China side are the subject of major considerations later in this Enclosure

<sup>1/</sup> This section is principally based upon the pertinent NIE's and SNIE's relating to political and economic conditions and trends in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Communist activities in the non-Communist world, and political and economic conditions and trends in underdeveloped countries.

15. The Soviet economy is expected to continue to grow at a rapid rate. Assuming that the U.S. maintains an average annual rate of growth in GNP of 3.5 to 4 percent, Soviet annual growth of 6 percent will lead to an increase from about 45 percent of U.S. GNP at present to about 50 percent by 1965. The predicted economic growth will enable the USSR to carry the burden of competitive armaments more easily, enlarge its foreign aid programs, raise living standards, and compete in world markets in an important way. Thus, economic growth will probably increase Soviet political leverage in world affairs.

16. The prospect of both economic growth and maintenance of large forces under arms in the USSR is seriously handicapped by a severe manpower shortage that will get worse during the next decade. The impact of the low birth rate of a generation ago is now beginning to be severely felt and will get worse. The U.S. population of military age is now only about 3/5 that of USSR, but in 1970 will be nearly equal.<sup>1/</sup> The current 7-year plan commits generous resources to training personnel and providing research facilities. This will offset, to some uncalculated extent, the shortage in total numbers of workers. By 1964 it is expected that Soviet manpower with scientific and

<sup>1/</sup> Because of the considerable differences in age group distribution of the total population as between the U.S. and the USSR, comparisons of the military age population of the two countries will differ when "military age" is defined differently. For instance, if we base the comparison on males ages 20-29 we get:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>U.S. as Fraction of USSR</u>
1960	11.2x10 <sup>6</sup>	19.2x10 <sup>6</sup>	.58
1970	15.6x10 <sup>6</sup>	16.1x10 <sup>6</sup>	.97

If, on the other hand, we count all males ages 20-49, we get:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>U.S. as Fraction of USSR</u>
1960	34.1	42.1	.81
1970	38.7	49.0	.79

The source of these figures is, for the USSR, unpublished estimates of the Foreign Manpower Research Office of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and for the U.S., M. Zitter and J.S. Siegel, Illustrative Projections of the Population of the U.S., by Age and Sex, 1960-1980, U.S. Bureau of the Census, (10 Nov 1958), p. 18.

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technical training will be about one-third larger than that of the U.S. and roughly comparable in quality. A great many of these trained persons will be required, however, for industries supplying consumer demands if standards of living are to continue to rise.

17. The capacity of the Bloc to project its power externally is expected to gain in strength and flexibility. Extension of territory under acknowledged Communist control is a distinct possibility. This will serve as expanded base for political operations. In addition, opportunities for Communist meddling are already great, and are reaching into areas not previously considered under serious threat. In the Far East and Southeast Asia, bellicose Communist Chinese policy could produce widespread turmoil and even major hostilities. Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia and Singapore remain unstable and particularly vulnerable to Communist influence. There is a fair chance that a Communist regime will come to power in one or another country in the area within the next five years, unless U.S. action can forestall such developments. In South Asia, Afghanistan has become deeply involved with the USSR in trade and economic and military aid programs. Even granted continued Western support, there is a possibility that it will come under effective Soviet domination within five years or so. The Pakistan-Afghan tribal areas could also be a source of conflict.

18. The Middle East will continue unstable, and there are serious dangers of further Communist in-roads. The situations in Iran and Iraq are precarious and could quickly become chaotic. In Africa the situation has been deteriorating rapidly in recent months. The Moroccan government is turning to the left. The Algerian nationalists are reorganized and supported by the Chinese Communists, Guinea is already Communist dominated, and



Communist penetration is evident in almost all of Africa south of the Sahara. There is a strong prospect of considerable influence, by one or another brand of Communism, in one or another guise, in most of the areas of former French and Belgian domination.

19. In Latin America, Communist prospects of penetration are improving as a result of infiltration of nationalists and revolutionary movements, as in Cuba; and, to a lesser extent as a result of Bloc trade and aid programs. Some expansion of Communist influence is predicted by intelligence estimates, but current estimates do not expect it to be widespread because of what are considered to be possibilities for U.S. countering actions.

20. The striking impression created by a general review of prospects is that the present trend of change in the uncommitted areas is on balance in the direction of Communist growth. What has been heretofore regarded as a contest very largely confined to the Eurasian land mass, has now extended into the Southern and Western Hemispheres. There are trouble spots in Germany, China, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East as before. But it is evident that we must also face the same issues, and be prepared to act in the same way, in Africa and perhaps even in Latin America. Therefore, the threat we face is an expanding one, and if military requirements exist in proportion to the dimensions of the threat, they too are undoubtedly expanding.

#### POSSIBILITY OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CHANGES

21. The degree of menace presented to the U.S. and the Free World generally is a product not only of the total strength of the Communist world, and of the total number of situations ripe for Communist exploitation. It is also a product of the way in which they pursue their goals, and of the degree of unity within

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their own ranks in respect to the pursuit of these goals. The way in which they pursue their goals concerns, for the purposes of this paper, their policies with respect to

- a. Risk taking,
- b. Inevitability of general war, and
- c. Feasibility of general nuclear war as a political instrument.

Their degree of unity, as considered here, is simply the prospect of unity of action in military affairs in a crisis involving U.S. military operations against a Communist state.

22. A central consideration is that there is a doctrinal division of the Communist world today.<sup>1/</sup> This doctrinal division is involved in most of the major issues of Communist policies, both domestic and foreign, and it is an important element in our consideration of the best manner of confronting the Communist threat not only politically, but militarily. One element, headed by Khrushchev and the presently dominant Soviet hierarchy (or, at the furthest extreme, by Tito and Yugoslav Party), is comparatively more responsive to internal pressures for better living, greater personal freedom, and, hence, wishes to reduce the proportion of total expenditures for armaments and for capital growth, favors less international risk-taking, is more inclined to accept the delays of gradualism in the evolution to Socialism, and is willing to make progress by expedient cooperation with other left-wing groups. In order to favor these processes, it readily tolerates, even may encourage, some relaxation of tensions.

23. The opposed group, led by the Chinese, puts great emphasis upon the most rapid capital growth possible, and favors extremely

1/ Appendix "A" to this Enclosure, "Recent Developments in Sino-Soviet Relations," discusses the present state of this dispute in more detail than is possible here.

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austere living standards and stern coercion as necessary to accomplish these ends. It advocates comparatively high sacrifices to maintain military strength, opposes disarmament, favors more rapid and aggressive exploitation of colonial and nationalistic unrest, insists upon direct and rapid change to Communist social forms, and shows greater readiness to accept risks of both local and general war.

24. The Chinese view favors greater readiness to assume risks, including the risks of both limited and general war. The Russians are apparently more convinced than the Chinese of the political appeal of peace-loving pretensions; they are in general a little more imbued with the caution that comes from a sense of having something to lose, and being aware of that as much as of what is to be gained. The Chinese view accepts the older Communist doctrine concerning the inevitability of a climactic general war which would bring final victory to Communism over Capitalism. Their view on the ultimate inevitability of general war is probably related to their greater optimism concerning the possible usefulness of general nuclear war as a political instrument. They seem to believe that the rural nature of Chinese culture would guarantee China's survival and even her victory in a general nuclear war.

25. In contrast to these Chinese attitudes, there is apparent consensus among the Soviet leadership that strongly favors policies that stop short of general war, and that discourage lesser wars also, partly at least, from fear that they might get out of hand. Russian leadership appears to have nearly come full circle, and almost to have resumed the previously condemned views of Malenkov concerning the disastrous probable consequences of thermonuclear warfare. There is also a doctrinal legacy which deplores adventurism. The effect of this is reinforced, so far

as attitudes toward possible nuclear war are concerned, by the pride that the present Soviet leadership feels in the industrial structure they have developed. There is apparent agreement within the Soviet leadership that things are going very well as they are, and that war might simply place at risk the progress that it already made, and the optimistic prospects now in view. Finally, they have found the peace issue politically useful, both at home and in uncommitted areas, and they have tried to project abroad the image of Communism as the advocate of peace -- an image to which they attach considerable value -- with considerable success in many places.

26. We do not know, of course, what views and plans Soviet officials may have for the use of their strategic offensive weapons. There may be secret plans or understandings of which we have no knowledge. What may be inferred from their actions, and from repeatedly expressed views on the destructiveness of nuclear warfare suggests a rather amorphous view that the most profitable role of Soviet strategic power is to serve as a counter-deterrent. However, there is no evidence that the Soviets have adopted deterrence as an articulated, rationalized policy in the sense that deterrence has been consecrated as an American policy. Soviet strategic writings dwell upon the conduct of wars rather than in deterrence of them.<sup>1/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> Soviet attitudes on war and military strategy have been studied, and discussed in well-known open publications by Raymond Garthoff (now with CIA) and Herbert S. Dinerstein (RAND), and have been dealt with in classified studies by these two individuals, and many others. CIA has published compilations of "Soviet Elite Statements on Nuclear Warfare." The Bureau of Intelligence Estimates of the Department of State follows the subject closely, and in August 1959 published "Some Aspects of the Soviet Attitude on War," SECRET. The judgments on Soviet strategy expressed here are based on these written sources plus oral consultation with some of the authorities cited concerning the special application to problems in this paper of their more general observations.

27. On the other hand, they have shown practical proficiency in nuclear blackmail, and are old hands at the immemorial practice of using the threat of military action to extort political concessions. They see the growth of their military strength as enhancing their ability to attain their ends by these means.

28. It can be argued that a basic U.S. objective should be to strengthen and confirm the apparent Soviet belief that general nuclear war is not a profitable instrument of national policy. Inasmuch as Communist China may seek to embroil the Soviet Union in war with the United States, it may also be desirable to convince the Chinese of the same proposition. While present evidence suggests that Soviet views on the matter are conservative, these views are, of course, subject to change. Certain pressures, such as the Soviet need to maintain leadership of the Communist movement abroad, may swing Soviet views toward the more radical positions now upheld by the Communist Chinese.

29. Appraisal of future prospects for Communist strategy, and consideration of U.S. policies that may affect it, must give prominence to the unusually fluid situation that now exists. The older doctrines adhered to quite predictably for many years are now subject to change. Russia has very recently attained a position of power close to equality with the West. This is new. Much of the former caution was probably in part a product of the regularly inferior strategic position of the Communist world. Reappraisal of the more cautious policies may be considered by Communist theorists to be in order. (This may well be a principal point in the argument of the Chinese Communists, namely that the new balance in the strategic equation justifies such reappraisal, hence greater readiness to accept risks to hasten their ultimate victory.)

30. An added force which may foster general reappraisal of older policies arises out of the extension of Communist involvement over the world. As Communist influence and footholds have spread, there has been extension of commitments for Soviet assistance and support of many kinds -- political, economical, technical and military. These commitments are seldom specific or nominally binding in areas removed from centers of Communist power, and are not likely therefore, as formal commitments, to require Soviet involvement in conflicts they would prefer to avoid. However, there is a growing competition among Communist factions for influence in the areas where older regimes are giving way. In this circumstance the pressure of the doctrinal struggle with the Chinese, who purport to do things faster, may make it increasingly difficult for the USSR to pursue as cautious a course as might have been followed otherwise. It may become necessary for the Russians to adopt more aggressive policies over a wider area of the globe simply to remain masters of the Communist movement.

31. Expert opinion does not now hold that the doctrinal dispute is likely to become so severe as to lead either the Soviet Union or Communist China to become indifferent to the security of its major ally. Current divisions between the two major Communist powers (outlined in Appendix "A" to this Enclosure) are important in indicating the range of strategy and tactics with which the Bloc may confront us, but they should not be allowed to obscure the powerful motivations for Sino-Soviet solidarity of purpose on routine issues of international politics and, above all, unity in the case of a critical confrontation with the U.S.

32. This is not to say that the doctrinal rift is of negligible military value to the United States. A genuine and enduring Sino-Soviet difference of opinion on the dangers of modern war may,

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for example, permit the U.S. to take stronger measures against Chinese peripheral aggression than would otherwise be possible. It appears, however, that U.S. action so strong as to constitute a threat to the existence of the Chinese Communist regime would be likely to elicit a Soviet response aimed at neutralizing such a threat, or at least lessening its impact.

PROBABLE RANGE OF DIFFERENT COMMUNIST POLICIES TOWARD WAR

33. The range of likely policy variation in the sixties appears to fall between two extremes, one of which might involve genuine moves by the Russians toward detente with the West, especially the U.S., possibly carrying the Chinese with them, but perhaps even at the expense of a de facto if not a de jure break with the Chinese Communists. At the other extreme, Russian views on risk-taking, the inevitability of general war, and the comparative advantage of general war, might come into agreement with those now held by the Chinese. In between, there is probably an area where Sino-Soviet views might be made to coincide on an approach to risk-taking that involved considerably more caution than the Chinese seem at present to favor. A major problem of this paper is to identify variable U.S. military moves which might conceivably influence these Communist Bloc policies one way or another.

34. Major objectives of American policy in the next decade probably will be not only to foster conservative attitudes on the part of both China and Russia toward a general nuclear war with the United States, but also to foster the divisive factors in the Sino-Russian alliance. With respect to the particular prospect of Communist Bloc divisiveness, while it is not clear precisely how U.S. actions might foster it, it is conceivable that events might take a turn that would bring about presently unexpected combinations. For instance, there may be a prospect, if further developments confirm the impressions created by



current intelligence, that Russia may in time become convinced that the excessive zeal of the Chinese leadership is highly dangerous to Russia, and to the world Communist movement as viewed from Moscow. If this becomes true, it could produce a situation in which a war between the U.S. and China, with the USSR remaining initially neutral, is imaginable, in a way that at present it is not.

35. In such an eventuality, it is to be assumed Russia would be standing by ready to pounce, and intent on dominating the peace. It is conceivable that, just as the Chinese Communists might upon occasion feel it desirable to involve the U.S. and the USSR in a war, sane Russian leadership might come to feel that a war between the U.S. and Communist China, if not desirable, might be turned into an opportunity to get rid of the unwelcome elements of Chinese Communism and weaken the U.S. as well.

#### POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF U.S. MILITARY POLICY UPON COMMUNIST STRATEGIES

36. As U.S. military power is the principal obstacle to Communist achievement of world hegemony, the posture, composition and strategy of U.S. forces can be expected to have a significant impact on the military actions of the Communist Bloc. (This influence is, of course, not one-sided. As the Bloc is generally conceded the advantage of initiating wars, both limited and general, the military capabilities of the Bloc may be said to be of greater importance to our military posture than is ours to them.)

37. Both these examples are theoretical extremes. In practice, by the time period of interest, the long-awaited strategic stalemate should have arrived. Unless there is a dramatically unforeseen turn in the course of events, both the U.S. and the USSR will then have strategic forces capable of inflicting

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unacceptable damage upon the other in a strike-second role.<sup>1/</sup> Strike-first capabilities will then have little significance in a general war of the kind commonly visualized between the U.S. and the USSR because neither will be able to deny to the other second-strike capability to deliver unprecedented disastrous retaliatory damage. In this situation, U.S. strategic offensive weapons can be expected to contribute to the deterrence of lesser aggression principally by deterring their escalation to all-out war, while the aggression itself is met directly by limited war forces. Discouraging the Sino-Soviet Bloc from such lesser aggression would rest more heavily than in the past or at present on limited war forces that can be employed with conspicuous avoidance of threat of general nuclear war.

38. Conceivable U.S. strategic postures would have widely variant effects on the courses of action rationally open to the Bloc leadership. At one extreme, an acknowledged U.S. first strike counterforce capability would be likely to have a valuable deterrent effect against Communist aggression overseas. At the other extreme, a U.S. strategic force limited in capability and intention to the infliction of punitive damage on the Soviet Union in a retaliatory strike would not only be ineffective in deterring overseas aggression, but might cause Soviet leaders to doubt that such a force would in fact be used in reply to their initial strike against our strategic forces. (The effect of both postures in deterring a general war would, of course, be influenced by the security of our forces and a number of other factors.)

39. As the anticipated strategic stalemate will not prevent war by accident or miscalculation, and as the Sino-Soviets are expected to retain the military advantages of initiative and

<sup>1/</sup> See the analysis of this problem in Enclosure "A", WSEG Report No. 50, TOP SECRET.

superior military intelligence, it will remain important that these other means be usable without incurring undue risks of precipitating general war. This in turn requires impressing the enemy with the proposition that he will avoid serious dangers by observing the restraints that our own moves may suggest. Such an impression may depend on Soviet knowledge that the U.S. possesses sufficient graduated forms of military power to significantly widen the scope of "local" conflicts should it choose to do so, without going all the way to an unrestricted, uncontrolled thermonuclear exchange.

40. There can be no fixed specification of nuclear deterrence requirements or supplemental supports without reference to enemy response to our preparations, or to the issues or circumstances these means apply to, and the general political context of their use. It is to be expected there will be cases where tactical nuclear weapons will not be needed, or where the immediate presence of nuclear capability is a detrimental embarrassment (for instance, Lebanon), or where their use would involve political costs greater than their military value. There may be other cases where the threat of localized use of nuclear weapons may deter conventional aggression, or prevent its spread (this may have been the case in the Quemoy Matsu crisis of 1958). Wherever there are nuclear weapons on both sides, however, the stalemate of strategic nuclears will very likely extend to so-called tactical nuclear weapons as well. The presence of some backup nuclear weaponry should be sufficient to prevent breaking this stalemate for limited purposes. It should likewise prevent unrestrained use of other means to attain the decisive ends that tactical nuclear weapons would be supposed to gain, for unlimited objectives are in the end as serious a challenge as unlimited means.

41. Limited war, however it is defined otherwise, involves mutual restraints upon the use of available means. Restraint by one side involves understanding, or hope, of the same or comparable restraint on the other side. Limitation of war depends, therefore, upon this understanding of enemy intent. There are probably circumstances of use of nuclear weapons, intended to be limited in violence and in objectives, which could be clearly and promptly perceived by an enemy to be deliberately limited. There are certainly also many possible uses of nuclear weapons in limited applications which we could not count upon the enemy, with confidence, to perceive immediately as limited in intent. Wherever this dividing line is, it may be argued that, below that level of evidently limited intent, there is hope that nuclear war may be kept limited. But the same logic suggests there is no reason for confidence that, once that level is exceeded, there can be much confidence that limitations will be observed. The dominant element of the problem is understanding. The decisive question, then, is what kinds of limited uses of nuclear weapons will be dependably and promptly understood by the enemy to be limited. What we know about the dependable correctness of rapid appraisals of great violence and battle situations, and of the value inevitably attached to rapid response, once full-scale nuclear response has been decided upon, does not encourage the view that there are likely to be many cases, except at sea or in other geographically distinguishable areas, where use could be made of nuclears below the level that would invite escalation. We may reasonably expect that a clear-cut difference in kind will be understood fairly well and fairly promptly. The available evidence offers little support for confidence that differences of degree will be thus clearly and promptly understood.

42. The growing number and geographical spread of actual or potential enemies, increasing the global dispersal of their strategic nuclear striking forces make the problem of an initial disarming strike both more difficult operationally, and more hazardous in the prospect of being discovered and surprised while in preparation. These difficulties operate both ways, of course. Spread of nuclear weaponry in the Free World complicates the problems of a possible Communist counterforce strike.

#### POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY TO CHINA

43. This is a special problem that needs prominent mention because it involves a possibility of ultimate major revision of the strategic balance in the Asian borders of the Pacific. There is increasing evidence of Chinese activity in the development of nuclear weapons. The current NIE (NIE 100-4-60, 20 September 1960) estimates that China may be able to detonate a nuclear device in the period 1962-1964 with a crude weapon deliverable by BULL bombers six months or so thereafter. Soviet assistance is considered critical, and the situation is presently not clear. The acquisition of a first-class nuclear capability is still a long way off, unless it were supplied by the USSR, but a nuclear nuisance capability is a distinct possibility for the 1964-1967 period.

44. It may not require a great or highly sophisticated Communist Chinese capability, however, to alter considerably the strategic balance in the Formosa Straits area, and perhaps also in Eastern and Southeastern Asia as a whole. The Chinese Communists have demonstrated an interest in testing U.S. resolution in the matter of Taiwan, even when they had no nuclear weapons and we had many. They may conclude, when they possess some small capability, that we would not be as ready to assume risks over Taiwan, but that, if in fact we did assume the risks of nuclear war with

China, Russia would be involuntarily but surely involved in a general war that would end the resistance of the capitalist world. The dilemma in the Formosan Straits area may be generally analogous to the situation in Europe, with the added complication that in the Asian area both local parties to the dispute have displayed an interest in getting their principals to fight it out, a factor certainly not present in the European situation.

45. Quite apart from actual use, proof of the mere existence of incipient nuclear capabilities for the Chinese Communists might have very disturbing effects on the ultimate stability of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, and likewise influence adversely the attitude of the governments of both Japan and Korea toward alliance with the U.S. There can be little doubt, either, that the propaganda value of such an accomplishment would be great in many other areas, especially in Southeast Asia. China's voice within the Communist world would be greatly strengthened, also.

#### INTERACTION OF U.S. AND COMMUNIST STRATEGY

46. Weapons systems, which are variable, are employed in strategies, which are variable, to attain objectives, which are variable, against an enemy whose means and strategies and objectives are also variable, and are in part determined by what we do. Military strength adequate for some objectives may be inadequate for others; and strategies appropriate to some issues may be inappropriate to others. Military strength should be designed to support national objectives and objectives should be fixed which are within the power of attainable military strength to support.

47. There are limits to what may be achieved by policies of deterrence, and when these limits are exceeded, deterrence is likely to fail. It is likely to fail because it becomes

incredible, or because it appears to the enemy intolerably oppressive or threatening. It may be incredible because it does not appear that the potential gains to ourselves are equivalent to the risks involved in invoking the deterrent force. This could lead to disregarding their enjoining intent, presumably at first by ambiguous and diversionary tactics. It may appear threatening or oppressive by being applied to issues as important to the enemy as the risks of nuclear war, or because the technical or strategic characteristics of our deterrent suggest that general nuclear war is inevitable or highly probable. This could serve to justify assumption of the risks of preventive or pre-emptive attack upon us as the lesser of two evils.

48. Theoretically, if the policy of deterrence is overextended in the issues to which the threat is applied, the deficiency might be repaired by strengthening the total defensive posture to a point where the risks were reduced to a level that appeared to be commensurate with the value of the objectives which were sought. This would give deterrence credibility by one means. Enclosure "A" suggests that improvements in strategic offensive posture cannot forcibly prevent the Soviets from destroying from half to nine-tenths of our people and wealth in a general war. This suggests that the problem cannot be solved solely by improvement of the military posture. The alternative is to reduce the area of issues to which deterrent policy is applied to a point where it is credible that we would invoke the deterrent in response to enemy violations.

49. Determination of the issues and objectives to which a nuclear deterrence policy should be applied is a political question, not a military question. The minimum conceivable application of the nuclear deterrence policy will probably be to deter

direct, unambiguous nuclear attacks upon the U.S. itself. But presumably the application of the deterrent threat will always extend somewhat further. This is because defense can seldom be counted upon to be effective if it sets out, from the first, to defend only the most vital areas. In other words, because preservation of the independence and integrity of the U.S. itself may be judged impossible unless other areas are also defended, it may remain credible that we would use the deterrent force in retaliation if closely allied areas were subjected to nuclear attack by the Soviet. But defense of more remote or less vital areas will have to be entrusted principally to means whose use does not involve such dangers to the U.S. In proportion as the areas defended by the strategic deterrent are reduced, they must be defended by other means.

50. The most important effect of the nuclear stalemate upon our total posture is that it will curtail drastically, and perhaps eliminate, our ability to project U.S. strategic power, as now defined, into foreign areas in support of American diplomatic policies which are not immediately and directly crucial to our continued national existence. It is important that political decisions concerning the use of military means in support of national policies be made in awareness of both the alternatives available to us in military postures applicable to the issues confronting us, and of the risks and possible consequences of these alternatives. The indicated adjustments to reduce the overextension of strategic deterrence will probably consist much less in changes of plans for the strategic force than in adjustments in strategy (addition of supplemental military forces), and adjustment of objectives to be sought by particular strategies and military means.



51. To suggest Soviet reactions to alternate U.S. strategic postures it is first necessary to assume that the Soviets will attribute roughly the same general characteristics to U.S. weapons and deployment patterns as we do. The Soviets could attribute certain value judgments and strategic choices to a particular U.S. weapons mix. The composition of the "mix" and a considerable amount of data on both weapons systems and U.S. judgments of them will, of course, be available to the Soviets in Congressional hearings, technical journals and other forms.

52. In addition, the Soviets have exhibited some specific reactions to certain types of strategic force deployment. They have expressed alarm over armed bomber flights over northern territories, calling such flights dangerous and therefore provocative. They have expressed some recent concern over the danger of war by accident, particularly the initiation of war on erroneous or misinterpreted warning signals. They have, on the other hand, described the concealment of their own strategic weaponry as ensuring retaliation, and therefore making war an unprofitable venture for the initiating nation. These may or may not be "genuine" expressions of Soviet opinion; they would, at least, not be irrational opinions for them to hold.

53. At one theoretical extreme, it may be judged that a U.S. strategic force posture capable only of punitive attacks upon cities, would have undesirable effects on Soviet strategic policies. This would emphasize that the U.S. could not rationally initiate a strategic strike in retaliation for major aggression against our allies, and might induce strong doubts that such a force would in fact be used in retaliation for a strike against U.S. military targets. At the other theoretical extreme, a U.S. force posture clearly limited in capability to

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an initiative first strike would probably encourage Soviet efforts to counter it and, quite possibly, would encourage a Soviet first strike in the period when this force was under construction.

APPENDIX "A" TO ENCLOSURE "J"

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Appendix "A" to  
Enclosure "J"  
WSEG Report No. 50

APPENDIX "A" TO ENCLOSURE "J"

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. This Appendix is a summary of events in Sino-Soviet relations apparent to the end of the summer of 1960, with a note on the still obscure developments since then (until late November, 1960). These trends warrant special attention because they suggest the apparent range of strategies with which the Communists may oppose us, and because they suggest the ultimate possibility of useful political leverage which, if it ever materialized, might affect the nature of our strategies.

2. But attention to the forces and time periods which emphasize the divisive elements in the Sino-Russian relationship should not obscure the still powerful reasons for Sino-Soviet solidity of purpose on most routine issues of international politics, and above all in case of a critical confrontation with the U.S. Recent trends may continue. But the party line may change, at either place, Moscow or Peking, not once, but many times. It has changed before, many times. The significance of the differences that became evident during 1960 is that they demonstrated the reality and the range of potential policy differences within the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

3. The Sino-Soviet relationship deteriorated rapidly during most of 1960. Both parties have taken extreme positions, opening the way for increasingly serious actions and counteractions. In October there were some signs that the Chinese were tempering their views sufficiently to reduce significantly the degree of open antagonism. But there can be little doubt of the genuineness of doctrinal rift that had developed out of the divergent circumstances which impelled the Chinese and the Russians into

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divergent policies. When the outcome of the November meetings is clear, it will be more evident than now what we may reasonably expect in the near future. But it is not believed that the expected words of nominal reconciliation will cure all of the sources of differences, and that the tendencies evident in the 1960 doctrinal dispute cannot be entirely removed quickly or by conference, and if it disappears in one form or context it is likely to appear again, later, in another form or context.

4. The Sino-Soviet dispute has been developing since 1957. At that time, the Chinese conceived their "great leap forward" in economic development -- a poorly planned program depending heavily on exhortation and coercion, contrary to Khrushchev's emphasis on material incentives. In early 1958, the Chinese conceived their audacious and heretical commune program. They launched this program without consulting the Soviet party, and they presented the communes as the form for an early "transition to Communism" and as worthy of emulation by other Communist states. They persisted in this program despite clear signs of Soviet disapproval. Although in 1959 Peiping modified both the commune program and the Chinese claims for it, the Soviets continued to disapprove the modified program and the remaining claims.

5. Originating in the same period was the even more critical dispute about world Communist strategy and tactics. This apparently began in divergent estimates of the Bloc's military power after the Soviet ICBM tests and sputnik launching in autumn 1957. Mao believed that the Bloc had clear military superiority, and that it thus could pursue a much more aggressive program all over the world -- short of initiating general war.

6. Over the following two years -- in party pronouncements, speeches by leaders, articles in party journals -- the issues of strategy and tactics in dispute between Moscow and Peiping were made clear. These were and still are: (1) whether the Soviet policy of low risks, "peaceful coexistence," and detente should be replaced by a more militant revolutionary policy, especially in the underdeveloped and former colonial areas; (2) whether the Bloc should seek to avoid local as well as general wars on the ground that local wars could get out of control (the Soviet view) or whether the Bloc should support and even incite wars of "liberation" and other "just" wars (the Chinese view); (3) whether disarmament is to be seriously negotiated with the West (the Soviets seem to say yes, the Chinese clearly say no); (4) whether Communist parties can usually or often take power in non-Communist countries without resort to armed uprisings and civil war; and (5) whether Communists in non-Bloc countries should press "minimum" (Soviet) or "maximum" (Chinese) programs, and to what degree they should cooperate with non-Communists such as socialists and trade unionists.

7. The Sino-Soviet dispute moved into its second stage in autumn 1959, with Khrushchev's trip to the United States and the preparations for summit talks. Khrushchev's policy drew heavy fire from Peiping, culminating in a series of unprecedentedly harsh and scornful Chinese attacks on Soviet strategy in Lenin Anniversary articles in April 1960.

8. It was apparent last June that the Chinese were not satisfied simply by the wrecking of the summit talks. The Chinese saw no signs of the fundamental change in Soviet policy for which they had long been calling. Thus, at a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Peiping in June,

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Chinese delegates spoke very strongly against Soviet positions, and they convoked private meetings with other delegates in which they denounced Soviet policies. Two of Mao Tse-tung's top lieutenants, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, were active in this way.

9. After the WFTU fiasco, the Soviet party immediately went on the offensive, quickly bringing the dispute into a new and critical phase -- similar to the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship in the spring of 1948 when Moscow was putting strong pressure on the Yugoslav party to force a change in policy or a change in leadership. A Pravda article of 12 June -- on "left-wing Communism" -- signalled the offensive.

10. The Soviet party made use of the Rumanian CP Congress at Bucharest, beginning 21 June, to convoke the Bloc parties and other parties of the Communist world. The Soviet party is reported to have sent to the other parties, in or about mid-June, a circular letter in support of its positions in the dispute with the Chinese.

11. Enroute to the Bucharest meeting, about 17 June, Soviet and Chinese representatives discussed their differences and could not resolve them. The Chinese representative is said to have promised to back down at Bucharest if the other parties were opposed to his positions.

12. It was apparently at this point that the Soviet party prepared an 84-page document which it distributed to the other parties on 21 June. This was presumably a more systematic and full account of the matters discussed in the Soviet circular letter of mid-June.

13. The Soviet party also indicated in public pronouncements the line it would take at Bucharest. A Pravda editorial of 20 June insisted that Bloc leaders "synchronize their watches," warned against "conceit" among Bloc leaders, and asserted that there could not be "two minds" on war and peace. Khrushchev spoke to the Rumanian party Congress on 21 June, strongly reaffirming his detente policy and declaring that those who interpret Lenin dogmatically "act like children." The Chinese delegate to the Congress, while fairly polite in his speech, also showed an intention not to yield any positions.

14. The Soviet letter of 21 June (cited above) -- distributed to the 64 other parties on the eve of the Bucharest meeting of World Communist parties which followed the Rumanian party Congress -- was a sensation, on the order of Khrushchev's "secret speech" of February, 1956, attacking Stalin.

15. The Soviet party letter began by rebuking the Chinese party for "improper and unacceptable" methods of criticizing Soviet policies -- during and after the WFTU Conference. These methods had included "circulating documents in all Communist parties" -- an unprecedented Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement.

16. The letter then accused the Chinese of failing to understand the changes in the world since Lenin's time, in particular the capability of the Bloc to restrain the aggressive plans of imperialism.

17. The letter then criticized the Chinese view that an eventual general war is inevitable, and that in any case there would be wars of other kinds. It accused Mao of having gone back on his agreement of November, 1957, that the Bloc should



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try to keep the peace for 15 years, after which the peace would keep itself.

18. The letter argued that "coexistence" did not -- as the Chinese charged -- impede the "liberation" movement. The Bloc, it said, would "support just wars" if necessary.

19. The letter reiterated the Soviet position that "peaceful coexistence" is not a "temporary tactical slogan" but is instead an objective necessity. It observed that a new general war would "wipe out nations and throw society back hundreds of years." It declared that the Soviet party was confident of a worldwide Communist victory after the Bloc had proved its industrial superiority during 10 to 15 years of "peaceful coexistence."

20. The letter went on to assert that coexistence did not mean an end to the "struggle." It pointed to recent developments in South Korea, Turkey and Japan, as evidence of gains that could be made.

21. The letter rejected the Chinese charge that the Soviet party was "flirting with the national bourgeoisie" -- Peiping's criticism of Soviet gradualist strategy for such countries as India, Indonesia and the UAR. It expressed confidence, contrary to the Chinese view, that bourgeois nationalist leaders weaken the forces available to the West.

22. The letter also rejected the Chinese charge that Khrushchev was throwing away the Bloc's military advantage. At the same time, the letter said the Chinese were wrong in regarding disarmament as an "illusion." Disarmament, at least to some degree, was possible and would work to the advantage of the Bloc -- both as an issue and as an accomplished fact.

23. The letter went on to rebuke the Chinese for disagreeing with the Soviet emphasis on the possibility of Communist parties winning power by peaceful means. It pointed out that the Soviet party did not say that this was the only way, simply that there were better possibilities for this way.

24. The letter then reproached the Chinese party for its "isolated" position in the world Communist front organizations (peace, labor, youth, women). The Chinese were said to have gone back on a 1954 agreement as to correct tactics.

25. The letter further criticized the Chinese party for failure to adhere in several respects to the November, 1957, declaration of the Communist parties which the CCP had signed. The letter extracted several passages from the declaration and set beside them contradictory statements from CCP pronouncements since 1957.

26. At this point, in discussing de-Stalinization, the Soviet letter took a slap at Mao personally. The Chinese position on Stalin -- not nearly as critical of Stalin as Khrushchev had been -- was said to obstruct the world Communist movement's work against the "cult of the individual." The implication was clear that there was another such cult in Communist China.

27. The letter went on to rebuke the Chinese party for criticizing the Soviet part "behind its back," for deriding the lines taken by other Communist parties, for "disloyal and uncomradely" behavior, for violating the principle of "proletarian internationalism," and for "lack of sincerity and respect" toward the Soviet party.

28. The letter observed that the Soviet party had "many times" tried to resolve its disputes with the Chinese party in bilateral talks which failed completely. The letter observed that the

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Soviet party had not criticized Mao's ill-considered experiment with the "hundred flowers" in 1956-1957, and had tactfully criticized the CCP's rejection of the "Leninist principle of material incentive" (in the Chinese "leap forward" and commune programs).

29. The most important part of the letter -- because the Soviet and Chinese substantive positions were already known -- was the conclusion. In this the Soviet party showed an intention to force the Chinese to back down or accept some serious consequences.

30. This part of the letter reminded the Chinese of the "unprecedented" scale of Soviet aid to China's economic and military development. It then moved directly to the statement that "We must do everything to overcome the difficulties in this relationship without sacrificing principles." It appealed to the Chinese to "take into account the interests of the world Communist movement," and it expressed confidence that the CCP would "draw the necessary conclusions." It concluded that the interests of the Bloc and the world Communist movement are "inseparable from the interests of the building of Communism" in China -- in other words, it warned implicitly that a Chinese failure to conform would result in a reduction or withdrawal of Soviet aid.

31. Khrushchev is reported to have given the Communist parties at Bucharest two days to consider this 84-page circular letter. He then spoke to the meeting, and is said to have added some detail to the charges against the Chinese set forth in the letter.

32. He is said to have denied a Chinese charge that the USSR was not properly preparing for possible war with the West, and

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to have countered with a charge that the Chinese had refused to permit the Russians to build certain installations in China for Soviet military purposes. In this connection, he is said to have remarked, at Bucharest, that he was resisting Chinese pressure for nuclear weapons, weapons which the Chinese were not reliable enough to be given.

33. He is also said to have criticized Chinese "chauvinist" policies in disputes with non-Communist governments (i.e., India and Indonesia).

34. He is also said to have accused the Chinese of forming pro-Chinese "factions" in other Communist parties, and to have complained specifically that the CCP was indoctrinating Latin American Communists in anti-Soviet feeling and was recommending "armed struggle" to them against Soviet wishes.

35. He is also said to have compared Mao with Stalin in the insularity of his thinking.

36. The Chinese delegate at Bucharest, Peng Chen, a CCP politburo member close to Mao, is reportedly to have responded hotly to Krushchev's speech. Peng is said to have reaffirmed Chinese positions, and is variously reported to have made these specific points: ultimately there must be war with the West; in the meantime, there must be a much firmer Bloc line; the neutral countries are insignificant in the struggle, and lean more to the West than to the Bloc; Moscow had prevented the Eastern European parties from adopting domestic programs similar to Peiping's; the Chinese party should have a free hand in Asia; the Soviet party had tried to speak for Peiping in international councils without Chinese consent; the CPSU had organized the Bucharest meeting to discredit the CCP; the CCP had no confidence

in Khrushchev's policies or in Khrushchev personally; and so on. An observer summed up Peng's performance as indicating that the Chinese did not retreat "one inch" at Bucharest.

37. Virtually all of the other Communist parties at the Bucharest meeting indicated their support of the Soviet position. It was perhaps this that induced the Chinese party to sign the innocuous Bucharest communique of the Communist parties. It was obvious to all, however, that this accommodation was unstable. The parties reportedly agreed to meet again in Moscow in November to try to reach a genuine resolution of the dispute.

38. The Chinese went home mad. There are credible reports that the Chinese party during the first week of July sent a stinging letter to the Soviet party.

39. The Chinese letter presumably rejected all of the positions set forth in the Soviet letter of 21 June and the charges added in Khrushchev's speech at Bucharest.

40. Judging from subsequent comments in the Chinese press, the Chinese letter of early July may have warned that, unless the Soviet party altered its positions to conform to Chinese positions, Peiping would expel Soviet technicians and would publicly renounce "all Soviet economic aid."

41. This Chinese letter apparently made the Soviet party as angry as the Chinese had been. The Soviet party is said to have fired back a letter stating its refusal to be dictated to by its junior. This letter, or one reflecting it, was reportedly sent to other Communist parties subsequently.

42. The Soviet party began at that time -- early July -- to prepare for the possibility of a break with the Chinese party.

It organized party meetings all over the country to discuss the dispute. The Soviet Home Service started to prepare the Russian people as well, by ceasing comment on Chinese affairs; this was similar to the boycott of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1948. Journals published by both Soviet and Chinese "friendship" organizations ceased to be distributed. The Soviet press (Kommunist, 11 July) resumed its attacks on dogmatists, sectarians, and leftist doctrinaires: these were in part answered by a Chinese speech of 22 July attacking "modern revisionists."

43. The Soviet party's central committee held a plenum in mid-July. The plenum resolution "completely approved" the line taken by the Soviet delegation at Bucharest, and it made the serious charge that the Chinese -- not named -- were guilty of "left wing sectarian deviation" and "narrow nationalism." These charges were similar to -- although not as strong as -- the Cominform resolution of June, 1948, which expelled the Yugoslav party.

44. Shortly after the Soviet party plenum, there began a departure of Soviet technicians from China. It is still not clear who took the initiative in these departures -- that is, who first moved from threats to action.

45. The Soviet party continued to press the offensive in August with several harsh attacks in Soviet media on Chinese policies and actions. (Kommunist, early August; Pravda, 7 August; Ponomarev in Pravda, 12 August; Pravda, 13 August; Zhukov in Pravda, 26 August.) These statements charged the Chinese with "blasphemy," with drawing "absurd" conclusions from the current world situation, and with departing from and failing to understand Marxism. They also charged the Chinese with "disorganizing" and "disorienting" other Communist parties -- presumably in preparation for a formal charge, at some future Bloc conclave, that the CCP is "splitting"

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the world Communist movement. Perhaps most important, Soviet and satellite media began to warn the Chinese -- named for the first time -- of the dreadful consequences for China of separation from the Bloc.

46. There were also abundant indications from the Chinese side during August that the Sino-Soviet relationship was deteriorating. Concurrently with the first departures of Soviet technicians, and just after a secret meeting of Chinese party leaders in Shanghai, a Shanghai journal published an emotional editorial emphasizing the advisability of relying on "one's own efforts." It observed that "reactionaries in some countries .... are trying to isolate us," are refusing "to let us progress to become rich and powerful." It declared, "we have a belly full of anger," and must use this anger for strength. This editorial was reprinted in the CCP's official party organ, People's Daily, on 13 August.

47. Also in early August, the Chinese, originally scheduled to send a huge delegation, did not attend the Orientalists' Congress in Moscow. And Mikoyan in his opening speech did not once mention China.

48. In mid-August articles in the Chinese press, there were further emotional passages. One article was by Li Fu-chan, a CCP politburo member responsible for long range economic planning. Li denounced the imperialists and "those who echo them" and declared that their "anti-Chinese activity" simply proved that "we are real Marxist-Leninists."

49. Li's article discussed the new policy of giving greater attention to the development of agriculture -- which reflected official concern over food shortages in China and reported inability to meet export quotas, but which also, perhaps, indicated

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and expectation of reduced Soviet aid to industry. In the same period, there were indications -- in Chinese overtures to Japan and other countries -- that Peiping may have been exploring the possibility of reorienting its foreign trade.

50. There were other articles in the Chinese press in August reaffirming positions known to be offensive to Moscow. On 13 August, People's Daily again denounced the "modern revisionists" and their "blasphemous talk" in criticizing Chinese positions on war. On 30 August -- replying to a 26 August Pravda defense of Soviet strategy for uncommitted countries -- People's Daily scored this Soviet strategy as a "violation" of Lenin's views, and it asserted that Mao's more aggressive line was "entirely" in agreement with Lenin's views and with the views of other Communist "faithful" to Marxism-Leninism.

51. As noted above, arrangements were made at Bucharest in June for another Bloc conclave in Moscow in November. During August, the Soviet party reportedly took a big step in preparing for the November meeting. It sent another letter -- reportedly the second since Bucharest -- to other Communist parties of the world in which it again set forth its positions in the dispute with Peiping.

52. In this letter the Soviet party admitted "sharp and strong" differences with the Chinese party. It expressed the hope that differences could be resolved and that discussion should never assume an "unhealthy" form, but it stated forthrightly that there "cannot be two opinions" on the matter of coordination between Communist parties and on "interpreting policy .... in a dogmatic manner." In other words, the Soviet party was asserting its leadership of the world Communist movement and its primacy in interpreting doctrine.



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53. The letter went on to explain again that Marxism must be applied in a changing world situation, and to assert that the Bloc is politically and militarily stronger than the West, a fact which effectively deters the West from war.

54. To achieve the defeat of imperialism, the letter said, the Bloc must win over the uncommitted countries, which would "rally around" the Bloc if the Bloc pursued a policy of "peaceful coexistence" accompanied by generous economic aid. Together with this, the Bloc would give "maximum possible support" to Communist parties in countries governed by bourgeois nationalists (Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno, Kassim, et al). Where Communist parties could function legally, the letter said, the task of providing support was comparatively simple; both the legal and the illegal parties should improve their underground organizations.

55. The letter went on to deny the Chinese charge that the Soviet party was thereby "strengthening . . . . reactionary regimes." The Chinese, the letter said, were "obsessed" by the "so-called strength of reaction" in the non-Communist world. The Communist cause was in fact making progress there, the letter said, whereas specifically Chinese prestige was falling. The Chinese had magnified "minor issues" (e.g., with India and Indonesia), and the resulting disputes had obstructed the Communist cause in "more than one way" and had made the work of the local Communist parties more difficult.

56. It was high time, the letter said, for this "dogmatic approach" of the Chinese to come to an end. To call the policy of coexistence revisionist was itself revisionist. To speak of the inevitability of war was to strengthen "war psychosis." It was un-Marxist to fail to observe the increasing conflicts between

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Afro-Asian countries and imperialism, and between the government of Afro-Asian countries and the "democratic" (Communist) movements there.

57. The letter concluded that in the interest of the world Communist movement, controversies should not be "publicly fanned." To manifest discord based on "sheer dogmatism" amounted to helping imperialism. The "sacred task" of the Communist parties was to resolve these differences, and the "first opportunity" would be at the Moscow meeting in November. In the meantime, the Soviet letter would give world Communist leaders a basis for their deliberations.

58. There were further developments in late August. Observers reported that departures of Soviet technicians from China were continuing, and that in at least one city (Peiping) the Chinese had made security arrangements to screen the departures from the populace. By the end of August, although no reliable figures were available, it was estimated by observers in Peiping that one-third to one-half of all Soviet technicians had departed. There was an unconfirmed report that Khrushchev in his August letter to other Communist parties (see above) had criticized the expulsion of the technicians. In the same period, Soviet leaders began to appear in Bloc capitols, presumably to add their voices to the Soviet letters appealing for support against the Chinese.

59. In the fall of 1960, beginning shortly before the celebration of the 43rd Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, there were some signs that Sino-Soviet relationships might take a turn for the better, superficially at least. There were a few official Chinese expressions of their enduring love of peace and even a statement for British TV consumption, by Chou En-lai, that

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global war was not inevitable. (The Chinese have never contended that global war was inevitable.) A Chinese delegation showed up for the Moscow celebration and remained for the top level Communist policy meetings that followed the public celebrations.

60. There is little prospect of a full reconciliation so long as the present leaderships of the two parties are in power and so long as the basic conditions prevail which predispose the parties of the two countries toward different policies. The disagreement is fundamental and it is founded on conditions which cannot be lastingly overcome merely by conferences. There is no present reasonable expectation of either a total split, or a full restoration of the level of unity which existed between the USSR and China before 1957. The practical questions are not whether there will be divergences of interest and policy preferences, but rather, what form the weakened Sino-Soviet relationship may take, how far it may extend, and what effect the doctrinal competition and divergences of the two will have upon the Communist strategies that we must face in the next decade. The general nature of the range of possibilities on this score now seems to be reasonably well represented by the doctrinal differences of 1960, however uncertain it may be which tendency will prevail most often, or in what degree.

APPENDIX "B" TO ENCLOSURE "J"

EFFECTS OF LIMITED WAR CAPABILITIES  
ON THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT POSTURE

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ON THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT POSTURE

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APPENDIX "B" TO ENCLOSURE "J"

EFFECTS OF LIMITED WAR CAPABILITIES  
ON THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT POSTURE

THE PROBLEM

1. To explore the interactions between nuclear deterrent and limited war capabilities.

SCOPE

2. This paper will address itself to the primary purposes of limited and general war capabilities in support of the policies of deterrence. It will relate the systems involved one to the other, and will discuss the effects of limited war capabilities on the strategic deterrent posture.

DEFINITIONS

3. As used in this paper, general war refers to wars in which strategic nuclear weapons are used against the homelands of the opponents; limited war refers to war in which strategic nuclear weapons are not used against the homelands of either side.

CONCLUSIONS

4. The present U.S. strategic posture, strong but not commanding in deterrence of general war, is weaker, but still substantial, in deterrence of large-scale aggression which might occur in developed areas, particularly in Europe.

5. As U.S. and Soviet postures approach strategic nuclear stalemate, U.S. strategic systems will be more uniquely effective in deterrence of general war, decreasingly effective in the deterrence of large-scale limited aggression.

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6. Tactical forces will have to assume an increasing responsibility to meet the threats of limited aggression, even large-scale aggression which might occur in Europe or elsewhere.

7. Any primary dependence of limited war forces on the employment of their tactical nuclear capability would restrict the effectiveness of these forces as a deterrent of Communist limited aggression.

8. Singly or in combination, the nuclear capabilities of strategic and tactical forces are ineffective in deterrence of small Communist aggression in underdeveloped areas.

9. A limited war posture, unduly weak in conventional capabilities in both manpower and weapons, can materially increase the probability of general war by accident or miscalculation and thus erode the deterrent effect of the strategic posture.

## DISCUSSION

### INTRODUCTION

10. An announced policy of the United States is the deterrence of Communist aggression. There are many factors which operate to deter a nation from a certain action; but passing over the effects of political beliefs, psychological motivations, and other intangibles one comes upon two elements which have important bearing on the ability of one side to deter another. One of these is possession of the requisite amount of power together with the ability to apply it; the other is the belief in the opponent's mind that this power will be used to prevent the accomplishment of his purpose. Should either of these elements be missing from the U.S. posture, when Communist aggression offers to them attractive possibilities of success, the deterrent policy is likely to fail.

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11. To further its deterrent policies the U.S. maintains a military posture including strategic and tactical forces, land, sea, and air. All of these systems interact in a complex fashion, and each complements the other in advancing the national objectives. To explore this interaction it is necessary to consider the systems separately, though always it must be borne in mind that none of the systems operates in isolation and that all contribute to the U.S. strategic posture in the deterrence of general and limited Communist aggression.

#### STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE OF GENERAL WAR

12. Of overriding importance to the nation is the deterrence of general nuclear war. The greatest military contribution to this deterrence is made by the strategic offensive weapons systems and, unless one side attains a position which it believes gives it so great an advantage that it can attack the other with relative impunity, it seems reasonable that, in the absence of accident or irrationality, mutual deterrence may succeed in the prevention of general war.

13. Since the capabilities of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are fast progressing to where substantial fractions of their strategic forces should survive a nuclear attack, the mutual deterrence to use of strategic war as a rational instrument of national policy should be even stronger in the future. Absolute stalemate may never be achieved; but, factually, strategic stalemate has been with us for some time, and U.S. and Soviet belief in the deterrent capability of their systems should harden over the next few years.

#### STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POSTURE AS A DETERRENT OF LIMITED WAR

14. In the deterrence of limited aggression, again two important elements are necessary to success of the policy -- possession



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of sufficient force to warrant belief that the U.S. could employ it to counter successfully a contemplated aggression, and a Communist credibility that the U.S. would actually apply the force. In spite of U.S. strategic posture intended to prevent Communist aggression, their aggressions have occurred several times -- in Korea, in Vietnam, in Hungary, in Tibet. Since the U.S. has not invariably succeeded in preventing Communist limited aggression, one or both elements must have been missing from the posture.

15. While strategic capabilities may be regarded as insuring that the homelands of the U.S. and the USSR will remain inviolate, and while we may claim that this posture will also bring the homelands of our allies underneath the protective umbrella, our allies do not place complete reliance on this policy. Consequently, they have taken measures to create their own deterrent. Neither we nor the enemy can easily believe that we would deliberately destroy the USSR and ourselves in response to a threat in some other area. The Soviets might entertain some doubts, however, about running even a small risk of enormous loss and, to this extent, the strategic capability contributes to deterrence of large-scale forms of aggression. Day by day, however, it becomes clearer that U.S. strategic systems are ineffective in deterrence of small limited aggressions. Our actual experience has been that the strategic systems have made no discernible contribution in deterring puppet states from undertaking aggression on their perimeters, nor have they prevented Communist elements from seizing power where the political climate was favorable. The strategic systems, then, have been inadequate to deter these types of aggression, not because of lack of nuclear power and means to deliver it, but because the Communists did not believe that U.S. would use it to stop their aggressions.

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Strategic systems, therefore, must be supplemented by other means.

#### THE LIMITED WAR POSTURE

16. Since U.S. national policy includes prevention of Communist expansion through limited aggressive actions, the nation must have adequate ready forces, ground, sea, and air, capable of quick reaction and of rapid movement to a threatened area. All of these forces must be so equipped that they can meet an enemy at least on an equal footing, and must be possessed of weapons systems adequate to the particular task at hand. They must be trained to operate against any forces which the enemy may bring against them. Of equal importance to the existence of these forces is enemy knowledge of their capabilities and his belief that they will be used should he undertake aggression. Friendly, neutral, and equivocal nations must also understand the capabilities and intent of use, else Communist ends can be more readily achieved through means more subtle than employment of force.

17. Both U.S. and Soviet ready-forces are now equipped with tactical nuclear weapons and both sides have trained in their use. Both sides have a conventional weapons capability as well, yet it is too well known for further elaboration here that the Soviets and their allies have much larger forces and much greater conventional capabilities than have the U.S. and its allies. In many areas of the world where limited war may occur, the Communists can have, initially, a decided conventional weapons advantage, an advantage which forces the U.S. to more dependence upon tactical nuclear weapons. Knowledge of this disparity in conventional strength is widespread as is knowledge that stated U.S. policy is to employ its nuclear capabilities to overcome the disparity.

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18. The world, as it exists today and as it will exist during the next decade at least, is composed of two general classes of nations usually referred to as the developed and the less developed, or underdeveloped, peoples of the earth. Communist aggression may be committed against either class of nation and the U.S. may be involved in resisting that aggression, striving in so doing, to prevent the conflict from broadening into general war.

19. War in the underdeveloped areas is likely to find U.S. forces in a posture more vulnerable to nuclear weapons than that of its opponents. U.S. tactical and logistical doctrine requires vast quantities of supplies, extensive and complex communications systems, elaborate maintenance establishments, and good sea and airports. Where these facilities do not exist, they must be established. As long as this U.S. posture is maintained, it will always offer an enemy some good targets for nuclear weapons. An enemy, on the other hand, is usually accustomed to subsisting, marching, and fighting on less. He frequently resorts to guerrilla-type operations where small arms, light artillery, and conventional explosives have great advantages; hence, targets against which tactical nuclear weapons can be profitably employed are less likely to exist for the U.S. side than for the Communist side. If, in spite of these distinctions, the U.S. should first employ nuclear weapons in a limited war in some underdeveloped area, it is only prudent to expect that Soviet Russia would support its side with this type of weapon also; and, if the U.S. is so fortunate as to have

<sup>1/</sup> For full treatment of this subject see WSEG Report No. 32, TOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA, Parts I, II, III and IV, dated 3 July 1958 to 15 July 1959.

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sanctuaries from which to operate, it is quite likely that sanctuaries will be available to the enemy as well.

20. There can be situations in limited wars in underdeveloped areas where the use of tactical nuclear weapons could be militarily advantageous to the U.S. Most obvious of these are opportunities for naval attacks against targets at sea, for land-based air attacks against similar targets at sea or in the air, and for interdiction of approach routes through mountain passes or other defiles. These types of targets, however, are likely to be rare exceptions. In any event, before using nuclear weapons, the advantages of their employment should be most carefully weighed against the possibility of counter use and the military necessity for the use of nuclear weapons, rather than conventional explosives, should be clearly apparent.

21. In addition to the military disadvantages in which the U.S. might be placed by resort to tactical nuclear weapons, there are political and psychological considerations of grave import. Just as there now exists in the Free World a general abhorrence of war as a political instrument, so is there throughout the world a greater abhorrence of atomic war. People and nations everywhere are progressively acquiring more knowledge of the effects of nuclear weapons and deeper realization of the consequences of their use. If the U.S. first uses an atomic weapon in limited war in a backward area, she must be prepared to face a storm of adverse world criticism which will follow, not only from the Soviet propaganda agencies, but also from nations other than Communistic -- perhaps even from friends and allies. Even if tactical nuclear weapons could prove militarily useful in limited wars of the type under discussion, the possibility of a net loss in the overall struggle against Communism must not be overlooked.

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22. In the backward areas, the effect of a tactical nuclear capability on the strategic system is clear in one way, not so clear in other ways. The possession of a tactical nuclear capability obviates the necessity of dependence on the strategic systems for deterrence of enemy use of nuclears in small wars in underdeveloped countries and, to that extent, should lower the chances of intercontinental nuclear war. The initial use of the weapon, however, may have the opposite effect. The skillful use of propaganda, at which the Soviets are adept, accompanied by their threats and attempts at nuclear blackmail, could not fail to heighten tensions in the world. Any increase in tensions trends to an increased danger of general war. With nuclear weapons employed on both sides, the conflict may expand to the point where sanctuaries cease to be honored and both sides may become so deeply involved that each additional increase in the scale of violence leads more and more in the direction of general war. Under these conditions, readiness of strategic forces will increase, intelligence may be misinterpreted, and national attitudes may be misunderstood to the point where one side or the other may conclude that his best hope of salvaging something of his national viability is to strike with all of the counterforce capability at his disposal.

23. Even the use of conventional arms alone would heighten tensions, as would any publicized conflicting maneuvers between the two opponents in situations short of war; but, should both sides refrain from the use of nuclears in limited war, the real issues in the struggle would tend to be less ambiguous in that they could not be obscured by a barrage of accusatory propaganda with which the Soviets would cover the entire world and which would emphasize the inhumanity of the U.S. in using

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nuclear weapons against defenseless peoples for the callous pursuit of its own imperialism. As long as the policies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union remain antithetical, international tension will increase or decrease depending on the national attitudes of the moment. The point is that they should not be heightened by unnecessary unilateral U.S. action to the degree that they would materially increase the danger of general war. Whether the use of tactical nuclear weapons in an attempt to defeat a Communist limited aggression in an underdeveloped area would bring tension to the explosive point, no one can say with assurance. Of equal importance, perhaps, is the fact that no one can say that it would not. Certainly it appears that the chances of limiting a conflict are better when tactical nuclear weapons do not have to be relied upon to stop a limited aggression once it has been undertaken.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LIMITED WAR -- DEVELOPED AREAS

24. Wars in developed areas of the world may well be large in scale. In Europe, for instance, the NATO alliance is face to face with Soviet and Satellite military power. There, an aggression against one NATO power is, by treaty, considered an aggression against all; yet there is no instrument which binds the NATO powers to a particular military reaction to a Soviet aggression in Europe, nor is there any binding agreement which requires the U.S. to resort to war should aggression occur.<sup>1/</sup> It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the possible responses to Soviet aggression in Europe, or to investigate the circumstances under which a limited war could occur. The paper concerns itself merely with the limited war posture should limited war on any scale occur in Europe, the relationship of

1/ Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty, signed 4 April 1949.

tactical nuclear weapons to the posture, and the interaction of the whole with the nuclear deterrent posture.

25. The U.S. posture, indeed the entire NATO attitude in Europe, is defensive. No single nation, or group of nations in or composing NATO, contemplates offensive action against the Soviet or its allies; nor are deployments, attitudes or composition of forces indicative of initial offensive intent.<sup>1/</sup> Should hostilities break out in Europe, there would probably be intense initial effort to keep them limited. Tactical nuclears are there, and are readily available to both the U.S. and Soviet forces. A Soviet aggression would have to be met initially in the homeland of our Allies where any use of tactical nuclears unilaterally by the U.S. would cause casualties and devastation to the peoples and property of friendly nations. While it is true that delivery against targets beyond the boundaries of Western Europe and actions at sea or in the air would not necessarily have this disadvantage, it is entirely illogical to assume that an enemy would limit his actions to restraints which the U.S. might desire. In all probability the employment of nuclears by the western powers would bring a nuclear response from the Russians.

26. Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe would increase many-fold the likelihood of general war. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for contestants to know at once whether nuclear strikes were occasioned by tactical bombs or strategic bombs, whether missiles were tactical, intermediate range, or even intercontinental; or whether to expect the next salvo to be

<sup>1/</sup> Soviets may consider U.S. strategic posture indicative of offensive intent. No qualified military analyst could regard NATO capabilities or deployments in Europe indicative of contemplated offensive action.

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the strongest blow of all -- an all-out intercontinental strike. In a situation so grave, the stakes would be so high that either side might, with plausible reason, launch its intercontinental attack in desperation.

27. In and among developed countries outside Europe, many of the conditions discussed above would apply in any limited war situation. In Australia, for instance, or in Japan, nuclear weapons might be used initially to repel invasion from the sea or air without exposing the friendly countries to damage from our own weapons systems. Yet if we accept as a logical deduction that the initial use of a nuclear weapon is an invitation to its counter use, even a sea or airborne attack, if pushed beyond the shore line, could ultimately result in heavier damage to the homeland of the defending side than that which would occur had the participants used conventional weapons in the engagements. Although in these particular localities the threat of general war resulting from the use of nuclears might not be so great as in Europe, the propaganda war could be severe, world tension would increase, and the problems of keeping the war limited would be enhanced.

#### THE ROLE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

28. A posture for the conduct of limited war in the developed areas of the world definitely calls for a U.S. tactical nuclear capability. Faced by an enemy so equipped, and without this capability, U.S. forces and friendly nations would be powerless to offer more than token resistance to a Soviet tactical nuclear attack, or else would necessarily have to depend on the strategic nuclear deterrent. We have already observed that this deterrent does not always deter.



29. The possession of a tactical nuclear capability and the use of the capability are two different matters entirely. In the developed areas of the world, even more than in those underdeveloped, tactical nuclears offer their greatest service in deterring the use of nuclears by an enemy. U.S. forces must be equipped with tactical nuclears and trained in their use, just as they must be prepared to operate under the threat of their employment by an enemy. But should these weapons actually be employed by either side, U.S. strategic systems must be continually primed and ready to go, either in a first-strike counterforce role or, surviving a Soviet strike, ready to launch against targets in the Soviet homelands.

#### SYNTHESIS OF THE LIMITED WAR POSTURE

30. The analysis developed in the above discussion has shown that strategic offensive weapons systems which compose the U.S. general war deterrent have been adequate to their primary mission and may so continue into the future. It has also developed the fact that these systems are inadequate to deter limited wars, and must be supplemented by systems which are designed to further that policy of deterrence. This supplemental capability has, up to the present time, failed to be completely successful. A limited war posture, to deter Soviet aggression in any type of society and in any areas where the Communists may contemplate military aggression, must be composed of both conventional and nuclear weapons systems where the nuclear systems may find their best role in the deterrence of the use of nuclears by an enemy; but where the actual employment of nuclears by U.S. forces may be disadvantageous, not only from the military point of view, but disadvantageous also in the political and psychological struggle between the Communistic and Free World nations. It follows, then, that

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the U.S. limited war capabilities should be built around a strong but flexible conventional weapons system with tactical nuclears available chiefly to deter their use by an enemy, or where their employment would be clearly and unequivocally to the advantage of the United States.

31. Since true deterrence of limited aggression depends on the credibility of use of the deterrent in the enemy's mind, the posture must be so designed that the capability of its employment is obvious. This means that limited war forces must exist in numbers sufficient to offer stiff resistance to enemies and strong support to friends. These forces, consisting of ground, sea, and air components, must be so organized, trained, equipped, and supported that they can react fast, arrive promptly in any threatened theater, and engage immediately in combat should it prove necessary. They must be capable of "tailoring" to fit the mission they are to undertake. Credibility of the existence of these forces, and of the U.S. intent to employ them against a Communist limited aggression must exist, not only in the minds of enemies, but in the minds of friendly peoples as well.

32. U.S. tactical forces, as presently configured, present the enemy with a very ambiguous threat. In many instances, the tactical nuclear weapon is of the same type and yield as is the strategic nuclear, a situation which gives little flexibility to the tactical systems. Moreover, the emphasis in development has been toward tactical delivery systems oriented primarily to nuclear weapons and much less toward delivery of conventional ordnance. Research and development for improvement of conventional ordnance and the means to deliver it continue to lag.<sup>1/</sup>

1/ WSEG Report No. 48, TOP SECRET, 1 August 1960.

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33. Numerically weak, and therefore weak in terms of pure conventional capabilities, tactical forces cannot effectively counter enemy aggressive actions except where circumstances preclude the enemy from massing his strength against us. Where the enemy can mass conventional forces against us, our ability to engage him is predicated upon use of nuclear weapons in quantity; yet where the enemy can face us with such a threat we are also restrained from using nuclear weapons, not only by local national vulnerabilities, but also by our own forces' vulnerabilities to Soviet nuclear counterattacks. Thus our posture directed toward deterring limited wars is not very convincing to an enemy who either initiates his action with nuclear attacks or initiates with conventional forces hoping to keep the war nonnuclear. To some extent, particularly in Europe, the Soviets would be deterred from initiating tactical nuclear war by their desire to limit destruction of European resources, their fear of nuclear reprisals from NATO countries which have their own nuclears, and their fear of our nuclear capabilities; but a numerically strong conventional U.S. tactical capability, supported by a tactical nuclear capability held in reserve, would certainly be a more reliable deterrent to any major aggression.

EFFECTS OF LIMITED WAR CAPABILITIES ON THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT POSTURE

34. Having observed that strategic and limited war postures interact one with the other, it now becomes possible to state some of the ways in which the limited posture affects the strategic. An adequate limited war capability has been shown to contribute to the nuclear deterrent, but probably an effective strategic nuclear posture could deter general war without this contribution. A strategic deterrent, however, has proven inadequate to deter limited war. A limited war capability,

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built preponderantly around a nuclear capability, the necessity for strategic systems. On this posture can increase tension and the war, it may increase the scale on which be developed and maintained. It has been shown that nuclear capability in the limited war posture can deter the use of nuclear weapons by an enemy, but it has also been shown that the limited war posture can increase the danger of escalation into general war.

35. A limited war capability built up with nuclear weapons ancillary and as a strength in manpower, provided the posture is credible, could reduce tension and render an outbreak of general war less likely. This would serve to reduce issues the resolution of which otherwise depend on the use of nuclear weapons. It does not mean, of course, that the development of sophisticated strategic systems should cease. It does mean that the overall strategic aims of the United States would be in a better position for achievement and that a realistic limited war posture, with tactical nuclear weapons viewed in proper perspective, could improve the deterrent effect of the strategic systems.